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Europe’s neighbourhood in the Middle East and North Africa is set to become even more 
instable. Are Europeans capable of securing their own southern flank? 
 
Summary 
Europe’s strategy for its southern flank is patchy, its military presence is limited and its 
US ally appears to be withdrawing. Europeans need an overall security strategy for the 
region, one that they can implement with their own resources, but that is ambitious 
enough to prevent threats to their security. The way forward is an ‘indirect approach’ to 
achieve limited ends. 
 
Analysis 
As Sir Halford Mackinder wrote in The Geographical Pivot of History (1904): ‘A vast belt 
of almost uninhabited, because practically rainless, land extends as the Sahara 
completely across Northern Africa into Arabia. Central and Southern Africa were almost 
as completely severed from Europe and Asia throughout the greater part of history as 
were the Americas and Australia. In fact, the southern boundary of Europe was and is 
the Sahara rather than the Mediterranean.’ 
 
The EU does not have an overarching strategy for the security of its southern 
neighbourhood in the Middle East and North Africa. Or, rather, it does not have a strategy 
that can be implemented today. The 2016 Global Strategy sets five priorities, including 
‘state and societal resilience to our east and south’. That is a broad objective; according 
to the Global Strategy, resilience means everything from sustainable development, 
human rights and democracy, to security. More importantly, it is an objective that can be 
pursued in a region that is at peace –but the Middle East and North Africa are at war–. 
 
NATO does not have an overall strategy for the region either. The main focus of the 
Alliance is naturally the east, where forces are deployed on its borders to deter Russia. 
The alliance is present in the south (with a training mission in Iraq since 2018) because 
Donald Trump wanted to see evidence of its contribution to the fight against terrorism, 
and the allies were anxious to appease a President who had made his scepticism of 
 
1 The author warmly thanks the Belgian officers and his colleague Nina Wilén who were willing to share 
their insights, based on their experience in the field. 
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NATO widely known. There was no military need for NATO to deploy, since the Global 
Coalition had been fighting ISIS in Iraq (and Syria) already since 2014. Nor was there 
any strategic consideration: the Coalition had in fact consciously avoided the NATO label 
in order to present itself as a truly international, rather than as a merely western, effort. 
 
Individual European states, meanwhile, pursue their national interests in specific 
countries of the region, often to the detriment of a common approach. 
 
Patchwork and piecemeal 
The result is a patchwork of objectives and a piecemeal approach to military operations 
in the region. 
 
The EU does have a comprehensive regional strategy for the Sahel, centred on Mali. 
The backbone of its military dimension is a 5,000-strong French operation: Barkhane. 
The Union as such has deployed a military training mission and two civilian capacity-
building missions (one in Niger) to train the internal security forces, and there are 15,000 
UN peacekeepers in operation MINUSMA. Effective cooperation between these various 
operations is limited. In spite of all these efforts, the security situation has been 
deteriorating rather than improving. 
 
There is no European strategy for Libya. The EU supports the UN-recognised 
Government of National Accord in Tripoli, but France has supported its contender, 
General Haftar. Russia and Turkey have filled the void left by the absence of an effective 
European strategy. The EU has tried to wrest back the diplomatic initiative, but for lack 
of engagement with the military dimension its leverage remains limited. Meanwhile, the 
civil war goes on. 
 
Europeans have but elements of strategy for the Middle East (and the Gulf). They seek 
to destroy ISIS, for which purpose the EU and all its member states have joined the 
Coalition (and the European allies accepted the NATO mission in Iraq). On this they are 
fully aligned with the US. The other EU objective is to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear 
weapons. This has led to a clash with the US, which has withdrawn from the nuclear deal 
that the EU considered to have achieved that objective. For the US, this is part of a 
regional strategy that supports Saudi Arabia in its rivalry with Iran. The EU does not have 
a regional strategy: there is no view of a desired regional order, nor even of a desired 
political end-state in Syria. Meanwhile, fighting continues in several countries. 
 
The EU and NATO have also deployed maritime operations in respectively the central 
and eastern Mediterranean. The current EU operation, Irini, has as its main task to 
implement the arms embargo against Libya, but it also contributes to the fight against 
human trafficking. NATO operation Sea Guardian focuses on maritime situational 
awareness. Neither operation has any significant impact on the region’s security 
situation. 
 
Strategic choices must be made 
The picture that emerges is very blurred: not even the geographic scope of European 
strategy is clear, let alone the precise ends. In view of the rising number of people that 
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have tried to move to Europe ever since the wars in Libya and Syria started, many in 
Europe have come to see the Mediterranean as the border –and some want that border 
(and the land border in South-Eastern Europe) closed–. Others feel the need to engage 
militarily in the Middle East and North Africa, which they see as a forward line of defence, 
where security problems have to be contained so they do not affect Europe. Yet others 
seek to pursue much more ambitious objectives and aim to reform the states of the 
region, which the EU Global Strategy defines as stretching south down to Central Africa. 
 
Unfortunately, the security situation in the region is much more likely to get worse rather 
than better as the COVID-19 pandemic interacts with the existing climate, economic, 
demographic and security challenges. The poor –both people and states– are getting 
poorer, while the rich hold their own. The struggle for scarce resources will intensify, 
weak states will lose even more leverage and support and subsidies from other powers 
that are hard-hit themselves will decrease. Growing instability in the Middle East and 
North Africa presents direct risks for the EU’s territory and for its connectivity with the 
world, far more than for any of the other global players such as the US, China and Russia. 
 
The US, in fact, has been disengaging from conflict resolution and crisis management in 
the region. While close to 50,000 troops remain in permanent bases in the Middle East, 
Trump has withdrawn forces from operations in Syria and Iraq (and Afghanistan), and is 
considering withdrawals from the Sahel as well. In June 2020 he even announced a 
major reduction of US forces in Germany. Whether the latter will happen probably 
depends on the outcome of the US presidential elections in November. A Democratic 
victory might mean less unconditional support for Saudi Arabia, and perhaps a review of 
US policy on Iran, and on Israel (whereas Trump’s support for Israel’s annexation plans 
in the West Bank has created yet another transatlantic divide). But the main trend is likely 
to continue: regardless of who wins, the number-one priority of US strategy will be the 
rise of China; the appetite for military involvement in the Middle East and North Africa 
will certainly not grow, but probably diminish even further. 
 
The conclusion is obvious: Europeans cannot rely on the US to secure their southern 
flank. Whether they act through the EU, NATO, ad hoc coalitions or alone, Europe’s 
states will have to look out for their own interests. Strategic choices have to be made. 
 
The ends: limited but not easy 
Europeans must settle on ends that can be achieved with the resources that they 
themselves can realistically commit yet that are sufficiently ambitious to safeguard their 
security interests. Withdrawing from the Middle East and North Africa and holding the 
line in the Mediterranean is not an option: the risk of negative spill-over effects of security 
crises is simply too great. Moreover, it is already the case that when Europeans and 
Americans move out, others move in. Europe cannot allow Russia, Turkey and the 
various Gulf states, or even China, to steer the policies of its southern neighbours in a 
direction that is detrimental to its interests. On the other hand, Europe has neither the 
means nor the leverage, nor even the legitimacy, to democratise and entirely remodel 
these countries. 
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Europe’s ends should therefore be limited. First, Europeans must help build a ring of 
states on Europe’s southern flank that provide sufficiently effective and inclusive 
government to appeal to their own broad population. That is a precondition for the second 
end: to build local security and defence forces that are able and willing to uphold an 
acceptable degree of internal security, in order to maintain that public support for the 
state. That, in turn, should ensure the ultimate end: to prevent the emergence of security 
problems that could threaten the European interest. 
 
Such ends do demand a military presence in the region, which will likely be as good as 
permanent. But the Europeans could continue to pursue an ‘indirect approach’, very 
much like today: the main instrument should remain capacity-building and mentoring of 
the national security and defence forces, so that they can undertake autonomous military 
operations. If assistance in operations is necessary, the states of the region should be 
called on first. European forces should intervene directly and use force only if there is no 
other way of maintaining an acceptable degree of stability and preventing threats to 
Europe, as when France acted in Mali. Examples of ‘triggers’ are when a conflict 
threatens to spill over onto European territory, to cut off Europe’s connectivity, to 
generate terrorism against Europe or to generate migration to Europe on such a scale 
that only restoring peace can prevent it. The UN Security Council activating the 
Responsibility to Protect would be another example: the EU was instrumental in creating 
this mechanism and the Europeans must therefore contribute to its implementation –but 
the divisions between the permanent members make its use highly unlikely–. 
 
The existing ‘indirect approach’ must be strengthened, however. First, Europe must be 
able to transfer weapons in addition to training troops. Troops cannot go into combat 
unarmed; if Europe cannot supply lethal equipment, states will turn to someone who will. 
Secondly, Europe should try and step up engagement with the senior levels of the 
security and defence forces, and with the political-strategic level. Capacity-building 
aimed at tactical and operational proficiency will have but limited effect if the partner state 
does not adopt an adequate strategy. This will always be a difficult balancing exercise, 
for the partner state must be in the lead. Yet more can be done, for example in terms of 
involving more senior officers, including generals and admirals, in staff courses, 
exercises and manoeuvres, both existing ones in Europe as well as specifically 
organised ones in the region. 
 
Even these limited ends are not easy to achieve; they will require a much more concerted 
effort from the EU, NATO and their members than is the case today. 
 
One strategy for the EU, NATO and their members 
Europeans will likely continue to engage military with the region in different frameworks 
–NATO, the EU, coalitions of the willing or bilaterally– but there ought to be a single 
strategy for the security of the Middle East and North Africa that guides all military efforts. 
Given that any strategy must be comprehensive and include the political, economic, and 
security dimensions, and that, moreover, the US is unlikely to step up its efforts in the 
region, it would be natural for the EU to set the strategy. On 16 June 2020 the EU’s 
Defence Ministers agreed to develop a ‘Strategic Compass’: this could be an opportunity 
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to reassess the threats and challenges, and to formulate a security strategy for Europe’s 
southern flank. 
 
Ongoing operations in the various frameworks, in the Sahel, in Iraq and Syria, and in the 
Mediterranean, could then be reviewed, and reoriented and strengthened as required. If 
US forces leave the Sahel, Europe ought to be capable of sustaining its current efforts 
alone, but it must prepare for that scenario now. Europeans must also start thinking about 
their security and defence engagement in Iraq and Syria after the current Coalition winds-
up its active operations, for that day will arrive. And Europeans must prepare an 
operation in Libya now: Europe must have a presence on the ground, in the form of a 
capacity-building mission, and forge close military relations with the government as soon 
as circumstances allow. 
 
Given that the EU ought to set the strategy, and that Europeans will have to bear most 
of the burden of a continued ‘indirect approach’, it seems logical that any new capacity-
building missions should be launched by the EU as such. If a crisis demands a larger-
scale intervention, then the operational framework must be chosen that is best suited to 
the case at hand, depending also on the degree of US involvement and the needs of 
headquarters for command and control of operations. If the use of force is required, an 
ad hoc coalition or NATO remains the most likely option for now. 
 
The ‘indirect approach’ too requires strategic enablers, as well as over-the-horizon 
reserves to extricate or reinforce a capacity-building mission if things go wrong. Pending 
the strengthening of the capabilities of the EU member states, these are two areas in 
which NATO could play a role, making arrangements involving non-EU allies to ensure 
the provision of enablers and the availability of reserve forces. 
 
Conclusion 
Thanks to NATO, Europe’s eastern flank is well in hand (for now), though, of course, 
the European allies must continue to increase their readiness and capabilities (ideally 
by progressively integrating their defence efforts through mechanisms such as 
Permanent Structured Cooperation). As the EU member states start to draft a 
‘Strategic Compass’, they will soon realise that it is the southern flank that demands 
more urgent attention now, for Europe’s strategy is patchy, its military presence limited 
and its US ally appears to be leaving. The needle is pointing south.  
